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Response to Ernst Alexander’s comments 
 
I am grateful to Ernst Alexander’s thoughtful comments (Alexander, 
2016) on my essay ‘Planning as Practice of Knowing’ (Davoudi, 2015) 
and to the editors of Planning Theory for providing the opportunity for an 
open intellectual conversation which under the current climate of 
performance indicators is often seen as an indulgence. 
There are two main parts to Alexander’s comments. In the first part, he 
raises a question. In the second part, he presents his own answer to that 
question which he then uses to build his remaining arguments. While the 
question is fair, the answer does not accurately represent the essay. Also, 
the arguments that follow from that answer appear to misunderstand my 
suggested framework, as I elaborate below. 
Alexander (2016) asks, ‘Why is the essay addressed specifically to 
planning’, why not replace the term planning in the title with the term 
‘action’ to make the ‘conceptualisation’ ‘of much wider and more general 
(if more abstract) relevance’? This is a fair point, put quite clearly in the 
second paragraph of the comments and then repeated in the subsequent 
five. I agree that a similar framing can be used to think about the 
relationship between knowledge and action in other fields such as those 
mentioned in Alexander’s comments. Indeed, the essay cites a number of 
other scholars who have argued along similar lines (if not the exact 
framework) in relation to other fields, notably Hendrick Wagenaar’s study 
of administrators. However, just because the framework is applicable to 
other fields, it does mean that ‘planning’ can be substituted with other 
subjects, and that is exactly the reason for the essay to speak about 
planning and not ‘cooking’. Alexander raises similar concerns about the 
work of Hoch and Friedmann who also speak of planning while, in his 
view, the points they make readily apply to other fields. 
After raising the question, Alexander provides his own answer: ‘I think 
I know the answer to my question’; it is because of Friedmann’s definition 
of planning, which ‘is problematic’ because ‘it can be just as well applied 
to other fields’. He follows this with a rhetorical question: ‘But is planning 
this kind of generic practice?’ (Alexander, 2016). Of course not and 
nowhere in the essay I have suggested or implied that planning is a generic 
practice. On the contrary, knowing what (epistemic knowledge) is an 
integral part of conceptualising planning as practice of knowing and this is 
clearly shown in my proposed framework and the diagram. I have written 
at length about the significance of ‘knowing what’ in planning (Davoudi 
and Pendlebury, 2010) and the need for advancing the epistemological 
understanding of space and place as key objects of planning’s intellectual 
enquiry (Davoudi, 2012). In the essay, I focused instead on conceptualising 
the relationship between knowledge and action because what distinguishes 
planning from other fields lies in not only its epistemic knowledge, 
important as it is, but also in the interaction between this and knowing how, 
knowing to what end and doing. So, although epistemic knowledge is 
necessary in the framing of planning as practice of knowing, it is not 
sufficient. What distinguishes a seasoned planner from a ‘world-league 
poker’ player (Alexander, 2016) is not just their different specialised 
knowledge and skills, but crucially their different values, a sense of the 
purpose of their knowing and doing, and the socio-political environment in 
which they operate. 
Contrary to Alexander’s assumed answer to his question, I speak about 
planning (and not cooking) not because I consider planning as ‘a generic 
subject’, but because planning has and should have claims to specific 
ways of knowing and doing. When I suggest that ‘everyone is 
knowledgeable’ (Davoudi, 2015: 322), I do not mean that everyone have 
the same forms of knowledge. I simply mean that different people 
contribute different forms of knowledge, and it is not helpful to demarcate 
some people as ‘expert’ and others as ‘lay’, or determine ‘who is suited to 
which type of knowledge’ (p. 322). This is because ‘normative knowledge 
is inescapably intertwined with other types of knowledge, and wherever 
we cut into the process, we see a fusion of science and politics, facts and 
values, norms and techniques’ (p. 322). Therefore, what distinguishes 
planners from poker players is as much about their knowing what as it is 
about their knowing to what end. 
In the latter part of his comments, Alexander appears to revert back to 
the conventional view of action as applied knowledge, suggesting, ‘I can’t 
think of a better conceptualisation of the application of the different kinds 
of knowledge there are, to [...] action’ (Alexander, 2016). While I am 
grateful for the complement, I feel that I am misunderstood because the 
entire essay is an attempt to challenge this perspective and suggest that 
action is a constitutive part of knowing; it is not merely an application of 
knowledge. The concept of knowing is used in the essay, instead of the 
term knowledge, to move away from bifurcation of theory and practice 
and from seeing action as ‘a precondition to, or coming before knowledge 
in a linear, causal chain’ and to conceptualise ‘knowledge and action as 
recursively interlinked’ (Davoudi, 2015: 317). None of these takes away 
the significance of knowing what; and none of this reduces planning to a 
generic subject. What they do is an attempt to develop 
a unified account of knowing (in its multiple forms) and doing in which 
knowing is not a simple matter of taking in knowledge; it involves a re-
conceptualisation of that which is assumed to be a natural category 
(such as evidence, experts) as a cultural and social construct. (Davoudi, 
2015: 327) 
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